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This lecture, delivered by the illustrious moral and political
philosopher Charles Taylor, has much to offer. One commentator
specifically envisions the lecture as a sort of belated concluding chapter
to Taylor's widely acclaimed Sources of the Self 1 But there is much
that Taylor has written with which this lecture's themes could be
meaningfully compared. The lecture is certainly more autobiographical
and self-revelatory than the bulk of Taylor's prior work.
In the course of his lecture, Taylor thinks of contemporary
intellectual culture as divided among secular humanists, a broadly
defined group of neo-Nietzscheans, and the acknowledgers of
transcendence. Transcendence here refers to a dimension of the good
extending beyond mundane human life. The acknowledgers of
transcendence are in turn subdivided into two groups. These are
roughly, the party of reaction, presumably indebted to figures such as
Edmund Burke, Joseph de Maistre, and Louis Bonald, and the party
devoted to expanding liberty and equality.
Taylor worries that the insensitivities and even depredations of
those who acknowledge transcendence,, along with the contributions
toward genuine human liberation made by those rejecting transcendence,
will combine to produce a distinctly unfortunate consequence. In
particular, we may come to suppose that at least at our historical
juncture, we would collectively be better off in entirely rejecting any
transcendental perspective and focusing exclusively on human
flourishing or fulfillment secularly conceived.
Secular human fulfillment is thought by Taylor to involve centrally
the broad project of pushing back the frontiers of suffering and death.
Taylor is nevertheless concerned, based largely on some elements of
twentieth century history, that serious risks attend a dominant anti-
transcendentalist culture. He argues that the denial of transcendence
may actually jeopardize the emancipatory project of expanding respect
for rights and for human lives.
1. See George Marsden, Matteo Ricci and the Prodigal Culture, herein at 83 (referring to
Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self(Harv. U. Press 1989)).
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Crucially, Taylor sees a purely secular aspiration to universal
human solidarity as dangerously fragile or unstable in its motivations.
The secularist may begin by embracing and uplifting the stranger, the
distant, the different, the victimized, and the oppressed. But secularist
benevolence may turn malign. The all-too-human refractoriness of the
objects of secularist benevolence may eventually provoke
disappointment and impatience. Taylor does not discuss the extent, if
any, to which such disappointment is ever left unacknowledged by
secularists. But Taylor emphasizes that secularist disappointment with
the objects of secularist benevolence may ultimately manifest itself,
perversely, in contempt, aggression, and violence toward those very
persons.
Taylor speaks of this exclusively secular emancipatory project as
motivated by a sense of one's self-worth and a sense, by extension, of
the worth or dignity of other persons. Actually, secular devotion to
extending liberty and equality need not be grounded in any sort of
introspective or intuitive sense of self-worth. Neither Kant, nor
contemporary neo-Kantians such as Barbara Herman, Thomas Hill,
Christine Korsgaard, and Allen Wood, need rely on such an
introspective sense. Neither, for that matter, do contemporary
utilitarians such as Peter Singer. Taylor could, presumably, expand his
critique of the secular motivational transformation described above to
encompass all such approaches.
More crucially, though, we may wonder whether Taylor's vision of
secularism's future does not excessively mirror, in an unduly literal way,
the excrescences of the secularist past. The future of secularist
motivations and politics may well be far less perverse than Taylor fears.
Even if, for the sake of argument, we now try to imagine the future
pathologies of secularist politics, we may wind up with a somewhat
different vision.
Already, for example, American secular politics has seen a scaling
back of aspiration and fervor in various areas, including immigration,
welfare policy, inequality of income and wealth, homelessness, capital
punishment, and even in universal, genuinely effective public education,
all during periods of peace and economic abundance. Do these trends
reflect or even anticipate secularist hostility, anger, aggression, and
coerciveness toward the disenfranchised? Or are these trends better
described in more muted terms, such as increasing indifference,
individual or group hedonism, ironism, jadedness, skepticism, cynicism,
Weltschmerz, or ennui? Such moods may be transient, but some might
also be quite stable over the long term, and in that further sense
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"secular" as well. The virtue of tolerance can perhaps degenerate into
indifferent tolerance of sheer unfairness. The values of pluralism and
diversity might perversely come to encompass a plurality of diverse
ways of suffering unjustly. When we even now commonly ignore mass
starvation or genocidal movements, do we do so out of anything like
genuine overt hostility, as opposed to some form of narrow moral focus
or of indifference?
None of this is to suggest, of course, that even the more responsible
elements of the party of transcendence are incapable of similar, if not
worse, irresponsibility. But while our enormous collective wealth and
preoccupation with consumption and market-oriented gratification may
have marginalized at least some forms of concern for transcendence,
these same broadly economic phenomena may also be reducing the
moral seriousness with which we address the various social issues
referred to above. Of late, some elements of secular liberalism have
drifted toward a sort of broad, indifferentialist libertarianism closer to
current "right-wing" Chicago-school libertarianism than previous
generations of secular liberals would have thought appropriate. The
looming problem, then, is not the eventual guillotining of the sans
culottes, but our fundamental unseriousness toward such persons in a
consumptionist society.
The party of transcendence, on the other hand, can and should more
unequivocally promote the general pushing back of suffering and death.
Any abatement of this effort, for the sake of potentially valuable
spiritual experience, is quite unnecessary as long as no critical shortage
of suffering and death impends. Rather, suffering and death, whether of
humans or of our fellow creatures, should prompt us to choose freely to
develop our individual and collective capacities, the better to understand
and control the incidence of suffering and death. In this freely chosen
developmental process, we manifest our sense of responsibility and exalt
our better nature.
This is a matter of some importance. Taylor appreciates that most
of those who are unsympathetic with the idea of transcendence are not
thus disposed because they have themselves refuted Anselmian or
Thomistic deductive arguments for transcendence. Far more
importantly, the party of transcendence is morally blameworthy for its
own excesses. But more deeply, it is often intuitively felt that there is
simply more animal suffering and undeserved human suffering than can
be reasonably accounted for on the assumption of a transcendent being
as traditionally conceived. Contemporary lack of sympathy with the
idea of transcendence is thus, as Taylor notes, based largely on moral
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ideas and moral judgments.
The vague sense of gratuitous, unredeemed, unaccountable
suffering does seem widespread, and a number of contemporary writers
have begun to address these concerns in a philosophically sophisticated
way. Names such as Richard Swinbume, Peter van Inwagen, and
Stephen Wykstra, come to mind. The partisans of transcendence owe,
certainly, the best and most broadly convincing account of why we
encounter suffering in the forms and degrees we do.
Part of that account, it seems, should rely on the still rather widely
shared sense of the enormous moral and dignitary value of genuine
freedom of human choice, and of the human capacity to assume
increasing collective responsibility, partly through freely choosing to
develop our collective capacities over time in various ways relevant to
the incidence and degree of suffering. Surely the value of freely
choosing, and being increasingly able, to push back the frontiers of
suffering and death will still strike many nontranscendentalists as of
greater meaning, dignity, and value than, say, living in a hypothetical
alternative world in which we are by nature simply incapable of doing
significant harm to one another or to our fellow creatures.
Taylor's lecture is commented upon by William M. Shea,
Rosemary Luling Haughton, George Marsden, and Jean Bethke Elshtain.
Each of these commentaries is thoughtful, and collectively they raise a
number of significant issues. Professor Taylor's concluding reflections
in turn respond to the commentaries. Among the themes concisely
emphasized by Taylor's response is the value of communitarianism,
based on the importance of our inescapable interdependency, mutual
constitutiveness, complementarity, and the value of solidarity.
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